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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal, we are called upon to determine 
whether Anthony Robinson, when he brandished a firearm in 
the commission of a Hobbs Act robbery, committed a “crime 
of violence.”  On September 17, 2014, Anthony Robinson 
was convicted of one count, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), of 
brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of 
violence and two counts, under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), of 
Hobbs Act robbery.  On appeal, Robinson asks us to overturn 
his conviction on the § 924(c) offense on the basis that Hobbs 
Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.”  We conclude that 
when, as here, the two offenses, robbery and brandishing a 
gun, have been tried together and the jury has reached a guilty 
verdict on both offenses, the Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a 
crime of violence under the “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(3)(A).  Thus, for the reasons stated below, we will 
affirm Robinson’s conviction on all counts.  However, with 
the agreement of the government, we will remand this matter 
for further proceedings to determine whether Robinson was 
properly sentenced as a career offender. 
 
I. 
 On December 1, 2012, Robinson committed two 
robberies in Philadelphia, approximately two hours apart.  In 
the first of these robberies, Robinson produced a handgun and 
demanded all of the money in the cash register from the 
cashier at a Subway sandwich shop.  In the second robbery at 
Anna’s Linens store, Robinson again produced a handgun and 
demanded the money in the register from the store’s cashier.  
Both robberies were recorded by on-site video surveillance 
cameras. 
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 The next day, the Subway cashier observed Robinson 
walking on the street and, recognizing him as the perpetrator 
from the previous day’s robbery, immediately notified police.  
After police recovered surveillance video and compared 
Robinson’s image to that of the robber in the video, Robinson 
was arrested for the Subway robbery.  Suspecting that 
Robinson might also have been responsible for the Anna’s 
Linens robbery, a Philadelphia Police Detective prepared a 
photo array that included a photograph of Robinson.  The 
cashier identified Robinson from the array. 
 
 On May 9, 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment 
charging Robinson with two counts of robbery by means of 
actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury, by 
brandishing a handgun, affecting interstate commerce, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), also known as Hobbs Act 
robbery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Prior to trial, Robinson moved to 
suppress, inter alia, the photo array identification made by the 
Anna’s Linens cashier.  This motion was denied.  Robinson 
also submitted a letter to the District Court requesting to 
proceed pro se.  During an ex parte hearing to consider this 
request, Robinson decided to proceed with counsel.  Later, 
following a hearing on his motion to suppress, Robinson 
made an oral request to proceed pro se.  The court directed 
Robinson to file a motion.  No motion was filed. 
 
 Following a two-day trial, Robinson was convicted of 
both robberies and of brandishing a firearm during and in 
relation to the Subway robbery.  Robinson was sentenced as a 
career offender based on a 1990 Pennsylvania robbery 
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conviction and a 2009 Maryland carjacking conviction.  This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 Robinson raises four issues on appeal:  (1) his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which requires that 
Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a “crime of violence” as it is 
defined therein; (2) the District Court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress the photo array identification; (3) the District 
Court’s failure to conduct a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. 
California1 in response to Robinson’s request to proceed pro 
se; and (4) Robinson’s “career offender” status, which 
requires that he have two prior convictions that meet the 
definition of “crime of violence” set forth in the Sentencing 
Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).  The District Court had 
jurisdiction over Robinson’s case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 of 
Robinson’s challenges of his conviction and pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 3742 of Robinson’s sentencing challenge.  We will 
focus our discussion on Robinson’s challenge of his § 924(c) 
conviction. 
 
III. 
 Robinson was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) of 
brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the Hobbs Act 
robbery of the Subway store.  On appeal, Robinson argues 
that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence as required 
for a conviction under § 924(c).  Because Robinson raises this 
issue for the first time on appeal, we will review for plain 
                                                 
1 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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error.2   
 
 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) defines a “crime of violence” as 
a felony that 
 
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or 
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.3 
These clauses are known as the “elements clause” and the 
“residual clause,” respectively.  Robinson asks us to hold that 
Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the 
elements clause and that the residual clause is void for 
vagueness in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States.4  Because we conclude that 
Robinson’s Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 
the elements clause, we will not address Robinson’s challenge 
to the residual clause.5 
                                                 
2 United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)-(B). 
4 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
5 Appellant argues that our recent decision in Baptiste v. 
Attorney Gen., No. 14-4476, 2016 WL 6595943, at *7 (3d 
Cir. Nov. 8, 2016) forecloses our application of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)’s residual clause.  Although we do not rely on the 
residual clause to resolve this case, we note that Baptise is not 
necessarily applicable here.  In Baptiste, the Court considered 
whether the defendant’s prior state conviction constituted a 
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A. 
 Both Robinson and the government suggest that our 
analysis under the elements clause should be guided by the 
so-called “categorical approach.”  We do not agree that the 
categorical approach applies here.  When the predicate 
offense, Hobbs Act robbery, and the § 924(c) offense are 
contemporaneous and tried to the same jury, the record of all 
necessary facts are before the district court.  The jury’s 
determination of the facts of the charged offenses 
unmistakably shed light on whether the predicate offense was 
committed with “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another.”  The 
remedial effect of the “categorical” approach is not necessary. 
 
 We can best explain our conclusion here by beginning 
with a review of the origin of and the reasons for the 
“categorical” approach.  The categorical approach emerged as 
a means of judicial analysis in Taylor v. United States.6  
Taylor involved a criminal defendant challenging the 
imposition of a sentencing enhancement known as the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which 
applies when a defendant has three prior convictions for a 
“violent felony.”7  The issue in Taylor was whether two 
                                                                                                             
predicate violent offense.  Our inquiry here, however, asks 
whether a federal offense that was contemporaneously tried 
with § 924(c) possession may properly serve as a predicate 
offense.  Resolution here is distinguishable because it does 
not require consideration of a prior state conviction.     
 
6 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
7 Id. at 578. 
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second-degree burglary convictions under Missouri law could 
be considered violent felonies for the purpose of applying the 
enhancement.  The Taylor Court concluded that only the 
conviction itself and the statutory definition of the particular 
offense, and not a description of the defendant’s conduct, 
could be considered in determining whether an offense 
qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA.8   
 
 Taylor’s categorical approach rested on three 
rationales.  First, the language defining “violent felony” in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) supports the notion that sentencing 
courts are to look at the offense of conviction itself and not at 
particular facts of an underlying conviction.9  Second, the 
legislative history of the ACCA suggests that Congress 
intended that sentencing courts use a categorical approach.10  
Third, a fact-based approach would produce “practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness.”11  Violent felony 
convictions that are counted for an ACCA enhancement are 
often adjudicated by different courts in proceedings that 
occurred long before the defendant’s sentencing.  In Taylor, 
the two convictions at issue had been adjudicated in Missouri 
state courts; the most recent of these convictions had occurred 
17 years prior to the proposed application of the ACCA.12  
The Taylor Court recognized the challenges in determining 
the precise facts underlying a defendant’s conviction when 
those facts are not plain from the elements of the offense 
itself.  Determining facts of the earlier conviction could 
                                                 
8 Id. at 602. 
9 Id. at 600-01. 
10 Id. at 601. 
11 Id. at 601-02. 
12 Id. at 578. 
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require a sentencing court to engage in evidentiary inquiries 
based on what occurred at a trial in the distant past.   
 
 Since the Court’s decision in Taylor, developments in 
the law have provided an additional reason for avoiding 
factual inquiries.  The Supreme Court has held that a criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when a fact 
that increases the maximum penalty for a crime is not 
submitted to a jury.13  As the Court recognized in Shepard v. 
United States, this principle would extend to determination of 
facts that render a particular crime a “violent felony” and 
therefore support application of the ACCA.14   
 
 The analysis in Taylor was born from the Court’s 
interpretation of the ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony” 
in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which provides in relevant part 
that a violent felony: 
 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another; or 
 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious risk of physical injury to another . . ..15 
Although Taylor focused on whether a Missouri burglary 
                                                 
13 Jones v. United States, 526 US. 227, 243 n.6 (1999); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
14 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005) (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, 
and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
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conviction would qualify as a “burglary” under the second 
clause of this definition—the “enumerated offenses” clause—
the Court’s justification of the categorical approach relied on 
the complete definition in § 924(e)(2)(B).16  Consequently, 
the categorical approach has been applied both to the other 
clauses in the ACCA’s “violent felony” definition as well as 
to definitions of similar terms that mirror much of the 
ACCA’s language.17 
 
 Despite the unequivocal language animating the 
decisions applying the categorical approach, the Taylor Court 
recognized that a “narrow range of cases” would require a 
sentencing court to look beyond the elements of an offense to 
“the charging paper and jury instructions” in order to 
determine whether a particular offense could qualify as a 
violent felony under the ACCA.18  This “modified categorical 
approach” applies when the statute defining the offense in 
                                                 
16 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02. 
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136-38 
(2010) (applying a categorical approach under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(i)); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684) 
(describing the application of the categorical approach to 
determine whether a particular crime is an “aggravated 
felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act); Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2004) (applying the categorical 
approach under 18 U.S.C. § 16, defining a “crime of 
violence”).  But see Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 
(2009) (statutory provision defining aggravated felony as an 
offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the 
victim or victims exceeds $10,000” called for factual inquiry 
regarding amount of loss). 
18 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
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question is “divisible”—that is, when one or more of the 
elements of the offense has an alternative.19  The modified 
categorical approach is not meant to supplant the categorical 
approach.  Rather, it “merely helps implement the categorical 
approach” when a defendant has been convicted of violating a 
statute that may only qualify as a predicate offense in 
particular applications of the statute.20  In order to determine 
what application of a statute is involved in a particular case, 
we can look at, among other documents, the charging 
documents.21 
 
 In the case before us of contemporaneous offenses of 
Hobbs Act robbery and of brandishing a handgun, the 
modified categorical approach is inherent in the district 
court’s consideration of the case because the relevant 
indictment and jury instructions are before the court.    
 
 For this reason, the approach we adopt here recognizes 
the differences between § 924(c) and other statutes that 
require categorical analysis, while at the same time being 
guided by the rationales put forth in Taylor and the limits set 
by our Constitution.  Because the determination of whether a 
particular crime qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 
924(c) depends upon both the predicate offense, here Hobbs 
Act robbery, and the contemporaneous conviction under § 
924(c), the § 924(c) conviction will shed light on the means 
by which the predicate offense was committed.  Looking at a 
contemporaneous conviction allows a court to determine the 
                                                 
19 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 
(2013). 
20 Id. at 2285. 
21 Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 
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basis for a defendant’s predicate conviction.  The defendant 
suffers no prejudice because the court is not finding any new 
facts which are not of record in the case before it.   
 We conclude that analyzing a § 924(c) predicate 
offense in a vacuum is unwarranted when the convictions of 
contemporaneous offenses, read together, necessarily support 
the determination that the predicate offense was committed 
with the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another.”22  In so 
doing, we do not direct courts to speculate as to facts.  The 
only facts that may support the conclusion that a particular 
crime is a “crime of violence” are those that have either been 
found by the jury or admitted by the defendant in a plea. 
 
  Robinson argues, however, that we should look at the 
statutory definition of Hobbs Act robbery and determine 
whether it “has as an element” the actual, threatened, or 
attempted use of force against person or property.23  Hobbs 
Act robbery is defined as 
 
the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property 
from the person or in the presence of another, against 
his will, by means of actual or threatened force , or 
violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his 
person or property, or property in his custody or 
possession, or the person or property of a relative or 
member of his family or of anyone in his company at 
the time of the taking or obtaining.24 
                                                 
22 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 
23 Id. 
24 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
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The definition of Hobbs Act robbery borrows conceptually, if 
not linguistically, from § 924(c)(3)(A)’s definition of “crime 
of violence.”  Both definitions refer to the use or threatened 
use of force against person or property, and the robbery 
definition goes so far as to include the term “violence.”  This 
language would seem adequate in and of itself to satisfy the 
“elements” clause of § 924(c)(2)(B). 
 
 Robinson contends, nevertheless, that under the 
categorical approach, we should look only to the minimum 
conduct criminalized by the statute in determining whether it 
is a crime of violence.25  Thus, Robinson described a number 
of scenarios in which someone could commit a Hobbs Act 
robbery without using or threatening to use force.  Robinson 
focuses on the phrase “fear of injury” to envisage a scenario 
where, for example, a threat is made to an intangible 
economic interest without any use of force.  Among 
Robinson’s examples are threats of “throwing paint on 
someone’s house, pouring chocolate syrup on someone’s 
passport, or spray painting someone’s car.” 
 
 While this display leaves no doubts in our minds that 
Robinson’s counsel is creative, it is not necessary to our 
analysis.  In addition to being convicted of Hobbs Act 
robbery, Robinson was convicted of brandishing a firearm 
while committing Hobbs Act robbery.  The question, 
therefore, is not “is Hobbs Act robbery a crime of violence?” 
but rather “is Hobbs Act robbery committed while 
brandishing a firearm a crime of violence?”  The answer to 
this question must be yes. 
 
                                                 
25 See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684. 
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 A firearm is “brandished” when all or part of the 
firearm is displayed or made known to another person in 
order to intimidate that person.26  Thus, from the two 
convictions combined, we know that in committing robbery 
Robinson (1) used or threatened force, violence, or injury to 
person or property, and (2) used a firearm in order to 
intimidate a person.   
 
This approach may not always be appropriate.  The 
definition of “crime of violence” still directs courts to look at 
the elements of an offense.  As such, the value in examining 
contemporaneous convictions is in elucidating what may be 
an otherwise ambiguous element in the statute.  It is possible 
that Robinson’s far-fetched scenarios could provide a basis 
for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), but the combined 
convictions before us make clear that the “actual or 
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury” in Robinson’s 
Hobbs Act robbery sprang from the barrel of a gun.  
Accordingly, we will affirm Robinson’s conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c). 
IV. 
 We now turn to Robinson’s challenges to the District 
Court’s denial of his suppression motion, the failure to 
conduct a Faretta27 hearing, and his classification as a “career 
offender” for sentencing purposes.  We hold that the District 
Court did not err in denying Robinson’s motion to suppress or 
in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing.  However, we will 
remand Robinson’s case for further sentencing proceedings.  
                                                 
26 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4). 
27 Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 
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A. 
 We review a ruling on the admission of identification 
testimony for abuse of discretion.28  An eyewitness 
identification that arises from an identification procedure that 
is unnecessarily suggestive and carries a substantial risk of 
misidentification may be suppressed under the Due Process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.29  A defendant seeking to 
suppress identification testimony has the burden of proving 
that the identification procedure used was unnecessarily 
suggestive.30  “The suggestiveness of a photographic array 
depends on several factors, including the size of the array, its 
manner of presentation, and its contents.  If there is no 
prejudice in the manner of presentation, the primary question 
is whether the suspect’s picture is so different from the rest 
that it suggests culpability.”31  We review a finding that a 
photo array was not unnecessarily suggestive for clear error.32 
 
 Robinson argued before the District Court that the 
photo array used to identify him was unduly suggestive 
because Robinson’s photo was “noticeably lighter than the 
others” and Robinson was “the only individual wearing a shirt 
with a collar.”  The District Court concluded that these 
differences were “slight” and were not unduly suggestive.  
The difference in lighting was found to be “within the range 
                                                 
28 United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
29 Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 137. 
30 United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
31 Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 260 (3d Cir. 1991). 
32 United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 130 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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of variation of all the photographs, some of which are darker 
than the others,” while the presence of a collar did not stand 
out among the “variation in necklines of the shirts” in the 
array’s other photographs.  We see no indication that the 
District Court clearly erred in reaching this conclusion.   
 
 Robinson raises for the first time on appeal the 
additional arguments that the array was unduly suggestive 
because of its size, because most of the other individuals have 
darker complexions than Robinson, and because his 
photograph was one of only two that has gray facial hair.  
However, a suppression argument raised for the first time on 
appeal is waived absent good cause.33  Robinson has not 
demonstrated good cause for his failure to raise these 
arguments, so we will not consider them. 
 
 Because the District Court did not clearly err and 
because Robinson’s additional arguments have been waived, 
we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Robinson’s 
suppression motion. 
B. 
 We next turn to Robinson’s allegation that the District 
Court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta inquiry following 
Robinson’s requests to proceed pro se.  We exercise plenary 
review of a claim that a District Court’s ruling violated a 
defendant’s right of self-representation.34 
 
 The Sixth Amendment affords all criminal defendants 
                                                 
33 United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008) 
34 United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel” for their 
defense.35  This right “carries as its corollary the right to 
proceed pro se.”36  The Supreme Court addressed the 
contours of a defendant’s right to self-representation in 
Faretta v. California, where the Court emphasized that “[t]he 
language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that 
counsel, like other defense tools guaranteed by the 
Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not an 
organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant 
and his right to defend himself personally.”37  However, 
because a defendant who chooses to represent himself 
relinquishes a number of benefits that come with the 
assistance of counsel, any defendant seeking to proceed pro 
se must “knowingly and intelligently” relinquish the 
assistance of counsel.38  Courts have the responsibility to 
engage in a “Faretta inquiry” to determine that a defendant’s 
request to proceed pro se has been made knowingly and 
intelligently.  In United States v. Peppers, we set forth three 
requirements that must be satisfied before a defendant may 
represent himself: 
 
1.  The defendant must assert his desire to proceed pro 
se clearly and unequivocally. 
2.  The court must inquire thoroughly to satisfy itself 
that the defendant understands the nature of the 
charges, the range of possible punishments, potential 
                                                 
35 U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
36 Peppers, 302 F.3d at 129. 
37 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
38 Id. at 835; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 
(1938) (holding that a waiver of constitutional rights must be 
knowing and intelligent). 
18 
 
defenses, technical problems that the defendant may 
encounter, and any other facts important to a general 
understanding of the risks involved. 
3.  The court must assure itself that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial.39  
 Robinson requested to proceed pro se on two 
occasions.  On the first occasion, when the request was made 
in a written motion, the District Court held a hearing to 
ascertain Robinson’s understanding of the law surrounding 
his charges.  In the midst of this hearing, Robinson informed 
the court that he had decided to retain counsel.  While 
Robinson suggests that the District Court’s hearing was 
“coercive” and caused him to “acquiesce” to retaining 
representation, the record shows that the District Court in 
informing Robinson of the risks of self-representation, noted 
that his lawyer was an experienced defense lawyer well-
versed in the issues that Robinson sought to raise.  This is not 
coercive.  It is exactly what a court is required to do when 
adjudicating a request to proceed without counsel.40 
 
 Robinson’s second request came following a hearing 
on Robinson’s motion to suppress.  As the hearing concluded, 
Robinson announced that he had a motion to file, which his 
counsel confirmed was a notice that Robinson wished to 
proceed pro se.  Rather than addressing Robinson’s desire to 
proceed pro se, the Court requested that counsel file any 
                                                 
39 Peppers, 302 F.3d at 132 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
40 See id. at 133 (noting that a proper Faretta inquiry requires 
“specific forewarning of the risks that foregoing counsel’s 
trained representation entails.”). 
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relevant motion.  Although Robinson’s counsel informed the 
court that she would file the motion, no motion was filed.  
When Robinson’s trial began, Robinson’s counsel advised the 
court that there were no outstanding issues.  Given these 
facts, we cannot say that Robinson expressed his desire to 
proceed pro se “clearly and unequivocally,” as required by 
Peppers:  no motion was filed and the issue was not raised 
again after its brief mention at the end of Robinson’s 
suppression hearing.  Without a clear and unequivocal request 
to proceed pro se, a Faretta inquiry is not necessary.41  Thus, 
we hold that Robinson’s right to self-representation was not 
abridged by the District Court’s failure to conduct a second 
Faretta inquiry. 
C. 
 The final issue in this appeal is Robinson’s challenge 
to his classification as a “career offender” under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Because Robinson did not object to 
his classification at sentencing, there is an inadequate record 
to review this claim.  The government has conceded, 
however, that the issue of whether Robinson qualifies as a 
career offender should, in the interests of justice, be remanded 
to the District Court to determine whether the career offender 
provision under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 applies.  We agree.  
  
 Accordingly, we will remand the case for further 
sentencing proceedings. 
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm 
                                                 
41 Id. at 132. 
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Robinson’s convictions under § 924(c) and § 1951(a).  
However, we will remand the case for further sentencing 
proceedings so that the District Court may determine if 
Robinson’s prior convictions were crimes of violence under 
the career offender guideline. 
 
1 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
 
 After a jury trial, defendant Anthony Robinson was 
found guilty of two counts of Hobbs Act robbery1 and one 
count of using a firearm during the commission of a crime of 
violence2 for robbing two Philadelphia stores.  Robinson 
demanded money from the cash register while brandishing a 
firearm.  Among other things, he appeals his Section 924(c) 
conviction, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of 
violence” within the meaning of Section 924(c).  After 
finding the categorical approach unnecessary here, the 
majority affirms Robinson’s Section 924(c) conviction 
because Robinson was simultaneously convicted of 
brandishing a firearm while committing a Hobbs Act 
robbery.3  I depart from the majority that the categorical 
approach should not be used when the convictions are 
simultaneous.   
 
Instead, I conclude that Congress intended for courts to 
use the categorical approach to determine what is or is not a 
“crime of violence” under Section 924(c).  This position is 
advocated by both Robinson and the government, and is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Mathis 
v. United States and the decisions of our sister circuits who 
have been confronted with the same question.4   
                                                          
1 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
3 Maj. Op. at 12.  
4 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); United 
States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Howard, 650 F. App’x 466 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 
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I. 
 
In my view, Congress intended Section 924(c)(3) to 
define “crime of violence” in terms of statutory elements of 
the contemporaneous conviction, rather than in terms of the 
actual underlying conduct of the defendant.  My analysis is 
guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United 
States.5  In that case, the Supreme Court found that Congress 
“intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the 
defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain 
categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior 
convictions”6 to determine whether sentencing enhancements 
apply under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e).  It did so for three reasons.   
 
First, the Court found that the text of Section 924(e) 
supports such a categorical approach by referring to persons 
who have “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony 
or a serious drug offense,”7 rather than persons who have 
committed violent felonies or serious drug offenses, and by 
defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for more than a year that ‘has as an element’—
not any crime that, in a particular case involves—the use or 
threat of force.”8  Second, legislative history is consistent 
with such an approach because though there was 
“considerable debate over what kinds of offenses to include 
and how to define them . . . no one suggested that a particular 
                                                          
5 495 U.S. 575 (1990).   
6 Id. at 600. 
7 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).   
8 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.   
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crime might sometimes count towards enhancement and 
sometimes not, depending on the facts of the case.”9  Third, 
the Court was persuaded by “the practical difficulties and 
potential unfairness of a factual approach.”10 
 
Here, Section 924(c)(3)(A) likewise defines “crime of 
violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another,” referring courts to the 
statutory elements, rather than to the underlying facts.  
Moreover, the legislative history of Section 924(c) similarly 
evinces congressional intent to define crime of violence in a 
categorical way rather than in a factual way.  The Senate 
report discussion of Section 924(c) included comments on 
which precise offenses are “crime[s] of violence” under the 
statute, but never which facts would qualify a conviction as a 
“crime of violence” and which facts would disqualify the 
same conviction.11   
 
I agree with the majority that some of the “practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness”12 concerns of a factual 
approach present in Taylor are not present in this case.  Here, 
Robinson was simultaneously convicted of both Hobbs Act 
robbery and Section 924(c), from which we can surmise 
without speculation that he brandished a gun while 
                                                          
9 Id. at 601.  
10 Id.   
11 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 312-13 (1983) (federal crimes such 
as the bank robbery statute and assault on federal officer 
statute are specifically discussed as prime examples of 
“crimes of violence”). 
12 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.   
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committing the robberies.  But I disagree that this alone 
renders the use of the categorical approach “unnecessary” 
when the statutory language and legislative history are as 
clear as those in Taylor that Congress intended courts to 
utilize a categorical approach to determining which crimes 
are “crimes of violence.”  Furthermore, taking a categorical 
approach avoids the circularity and ambiguity caused by the 
majority’s position that “the determination of whether a 
particular crime qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under § 
924(c) depends upon both the predicate offense, here Hobbs 
Act robbery, and the contemporaneous conviction under § 
924(c).”13  Indeed, other circuits have also taken this 
categorical approach to determine which offenses are “crimes 
of violence” under Section 924(c).14   
 
This does not end our analysis because even when the 
statute calls for an elements-based analysis, the categorical 
approach is not always possible.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Mathis v. United States, “[t]he comparison of 
elements that the categorical approach requires is 
straightforward when a statute sets out a single (or 
‘indivisible’) set of elements to define a single crime.  The 
court then lines up that crime’s elements alongside those of 
the generic offense and sees if they match.” 15  The 
categorical approach fails when a statute sets out alternative 
(or “divisible”) sets of elements, thereby creating multiple 
                                                          
13 Maj. Op. at 9-10.   
14 See Hill, 832 F.3d at 139-44 (holding that Hobbs Act 
robbery is categorically a crime of violence under Section 
924(c)); Howard, 650 F. App’x at 468 (same).   
15 136 S. Ct. at 2248.  
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crimes within a single statute.16  Consequently, whether a 
defendant’s violation of a divisible statute counts as a 
predicate crime depends on which of the alternative elements 
listed was actually committed, forcing courts to look beyond 
the statute and peek at documents such as “the indictment, 
jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy[] to 
determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was 
convicted of.  The court can then compare that crime, as the 
categorical approach commands, with the relevant generic 
offense.”17  This is the modified categorical approach. 
 
As the Supreme Court has reiterated, however, the 
modified categorical approach is approved only “for use with 
statutes having multiple alternative elements.”18  In other 
words, the simple fact that documents such as the indictment 
and the jury instructions are available does not mean that a 
court may look to them.  As the majority notes, the modified 
categorical approach is not meant to supplant the categorical 
approach where convenient, but “merely to help implement 
                                                          
16 Id. at 2249. 
17 Id. (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court explains this 
phenomenon in the ACCA context, using the following 
illustration:  A state burglary law prohibits “‘the lawful entry 
or the unlawful entry’ of a premises with intent to steal, so as 
to create two different offenses . . . .  If the defendant were 
convicted of the offense with unlawful entry as an element, 
then his crime of conviction would match generic burglary 
and count as an ACCA predicate; but, conversely, the 
conviction would not qualify if it were for the offense with 
lawful entry as an element.”  Id. 
18 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
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the categorical approach” when the court is confronted with a 
divisible statute.19     
  The Hobbs Act itself is a divisible statute.  A person 
is in violation of the Hobbs Act if he “obstructs, delays, or 
affects commerce or the movement of any article or 
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts 
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical 
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or 
purpose to do anything in violation of this section.”20  In 
short, a person may violate the Hobbs Act by either robbery 
or extortion.  But we are not asked whether a Hobbs Act 
violation is a crime of violence under Section 924(c).  
Instead, Robinson appeals only the question whether a Hobbs 
Act robbery, as defined by Section 1951(b), is a crime of 
violence.21  With this limitation, I find that a Hobbs Act 
robbery is not a divisible statute. 
   
Section 1951(b)(1) defines robbery as “the unlawful 
taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in 
the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual 
or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate 
or future, to his person or property.”   At a glance, the phrase 
                                                          
19 Maj. Op. at 9 (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013)); see also United States v. Brown, 765 
F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 2014) (“It bears repeating that the 
modified categorical approach is ‘applicable only to divisible 
statutes.’”). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
21 Appellant Br. at 3 (“Was Mr. Robinson wrongly convicted 
of brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), since 
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b), is not a categorical 
crime of violence . . . ?”). 
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“by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear 
of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property” is a 
disjunctive list.  But a disjunctive list of “factual means of 
committing a single element” does not render a statute 
divisible, whereas a disjunctive list of elements would. 22  
Therefore, we must determine whether this particular phrase 
is a list of alternative elements or a list of alternative means.   
 
Mathis instructs that one way to distinguish elements 
from means is by looking at the charge in the indictment and 
“the correlative jury instructions”—for example, if the 
defendant is charged with “burgling a building, structure, or 
vehicle,” then “each alternative is only a possible means of 
commission, not an element that the prosecutor must prove to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”23  The indictment and jury 
instructions in this case make clear that the statutory list of 
“actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, 
immediate or future, to [the victim’s] person or property” are 
all alternative means of committing the element of unlawful 
taking against the victim’s will, rather than alternative 
elements.24  Indeed, the district judge specifically instructed 
                                                          
22 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
23 Id. at 2257 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 See, e.g., App’x at 32-33 (indictment charging Robinson 
with “unlawfully [taking and obtaining] approximately $100 
United States currency, property of Subway, from the person 
or in the presence of J.H., an employee of Subway known to 
the grand jury, and against J.H.’s will, by means of actual and 
threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate and 
future, to her person and property, that is, by brandishing a 
handgun and using the handgun to threaten and intimidate the 
victim J.H.”).   
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the jury that “[t]he government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully took the 
alleged victim’s property against his or her will by actual or 
threatened force, violence or fear of injury, whether 
immediately or in the future,” but that “[t]he government 
satisfies its burden of proving an unlawful taking if you 
unanimously agree that the defendant employed any of these 
methods.”25   
 
Accordingly, a strict categorical approach is the 
appropriate method for determining whether Hobbs Act 
robbery is a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3).  
Nonetheless, for the reasons set out below, I concur with the 
majority that Robinson’s 924(c) conviction should be upheld. 
 
II. 
 
 Using the categorical approach, I come to the same 
conclusion as the majority that Hobbs Act robbery is in fact a 
“crime of violence.”  Section 924(c)(3)(A) defines a crime of 
violence as any felony that “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another.”  Hobbs Act robbery is defined 
as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property . . . 
by means of actual or threatened force, or violence or fear of 
injury, immediate or future, to his person or property.”26  The 
question is whether the list enumerated in the Hobbs Act 
robbery definition is broader than the list enumerated in 
Section 924(c)(3)(A).   
 
                                                          
25 App’x at 535.  
26 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). 
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 I find persuasive the Second Circuit’s recent decision 
in United States v. Hill on the same issue.  In a well-reasoned 
opinion, that court held that all the alternative means of 
committing a Hobbs Act robbery, “actual or threatened force, 
or violence, or fear of injury,” can satisfy Section 
924(c)(3)(A)’s requirement of “use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force” because the Supreme Court 
has already defined “physical force,” in the context of 
defining a violent felony, to be simply “force capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to another person.”27  In other 
words, by definition, a jury could have found “actual or 
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury” only if the 
defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use 
physical force because “fear of injury” cannot occur without 
at least a threat of physical force, and vice versa.28  
                                                          
27 Hill, 832 F.3d at 141-42 (citing Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 139-40 (2010)). 
28 Robinson argues that a Hobbs Act robbery cannot be a 
crime of violence because a defendant could commit a Hobbs 
Act robbery via non-violent means—for example, by 
threatening to throw paint on someone’s house.  The majority 
opinion did not address this argument because it was 
unnecessary under its analysis but the argument nonetheless 
fails even under the categorical approach.  Physical force, as 
explained by the Supreme Court, connotes simply force that 
is violent enough to be capable of causing injury.  Johnson, 
559 U.S. at 140.  No more, no less.  Thus, as long as a jury 
finds that a threat to throw paint can cause a “fear of injury” 
sufficient to satisfy Hobbs Act robbery, then that defendant 
has also sufficiently “threatened [to] use physical force” to 
satisfy the “crime of violence” definition.  Legislative history 
supports this position.  Congress specifically singled out the 
10 
 
Accordingly, I find that Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a 
crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3). 
 
 In conclusion, I concur in the judgment of the majority 
and will affirm Robinson’s Section 924(c) conviction.29  
                                                                                                                                  
federal bank robbery statute as a crime that is the prototypical 
“crime of violence” captured by Section 924(c).  See S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 312-13.  Yet, the federal bank robbery statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is analogous to Hobbs Act robbery.  See 
Howard, 650 F. App’x at 468.  Section 2113 may be violated 
by “force and violence, or by intimidation,” just as the Hobbs 
Act robbery statute may be violated by “actual or threatened 
force, or violence, or fear of injury.”  From this, we can 
surmise that Congress intended the “physical force” element 
to be satisfied by intimidation or, analogously, fear of injury. 
29 In addition to concurring in the judgment, I concur with the 
majority’s analysis in Section IV.  
